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Abstract
This paper presents a theory of location choice that draws on insights from
the incomplete contracts and investment ￿exibility (real option) literatures.
We provide conditions under which human capital is more eﬃciently created
and better utilized within industrial clusters that contain similar ￿rms. Our
analysis indicates that location choices are in￿uenced by the extent to which
training costs are borne by ￿rms versus employees as well as by the uncertainty
about future productivity shocks and the ability of ￿rms to modify the scale
of their operations. Extensions of our model consider, among other things,
endogenous technological choices by ￿rms in clusters and how behavioral biases
(i.e., managerial overcon￿dence about their ￿rms￿ prospects) can aﬀect ￿rms￿
location choices.
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of Texas and to Aydogan Alti, Ty Callahan and Frederic Robert-Nicoud for helpful comments.1 Introduction
One of the fundamental issues in economics relates to the location of production.
Where ￿rms and industries locate is a primary determinant of the economic growth
of both regional and national economies. These choices aﬀect the design of our cities
as well as the pattern of trade between nations.
This paper examines the location choice of ￿rms within knowledge-based indus-
tries (e.g., software and pharmaceutical development). Speci￿cally, we consider the
incentives of these ￿rms to locate either together, within geographical clusters, or in
a number of geographically separate regions. The issue of industrial clustering dates
back at least to Marshall (1890) and has received substantial attention in the recent
literature.1 By focusing on transportation costs and exogenous natural advantages,
the early literature explains why ￿rms in some industries tend to locate in a number
of geographically separate regions.2 This literature, however, is much less applicable
to knowledge-based ￿rms whose products are almost costless to transport and which
employ very little in the way of resources other than human capital.3 More applicable
are the arguments that focus on the advantages of clustering that arise because of
the bene￿ts of a more active market for skilled labor and the potential for knowledge
spillovers.
The discussion in most of the recent literature, which points to Silicon Valley
1There is an extensive urban economics literature that addresses location issues for generic in-
dustries. For excellent reviews see Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999), Fujita and Thisse (2002)
and Duranton and Puga (2003).
2Ellison and Glaeser (1999) ￿nd that proxies related to natural advantages can explain roughly
20% of their empirical measures of agglomeration.
3Abstracting from transportation costs seems particularly suitable to explain location in
knowledge-based industries. Moreover, Glaeser and Kohlhase (2003) have reported that transporta-
tion costs for manufacturing goods have fallen by over 90% in the last century, and argue that, to a
large extent, the world is better characterized as a place where ￿it is essentially free to move goods,
but expensive to move people.￿ This suggests that the issues that we discuss here may be more
broadly applicable.
1as the quintessential example, is that strong economic forces lead knowledge-based
industries to cluster.4 However, this literature generally ignores those cases of suc-
cessful knowledge-based ￿rms that locate away from industrial clusters. The most
notable case is Microsoft, which became the industry leader after locating in Seattle,
which at the time was not a center for software development. Another notable case
is Nations-Bank, a North Carolina Bank which became one of the largest banks in
the U.S. after taking over Bank of America.5
The model developed in this paper is consistent with the Silicon Valley phenomena
as well as with the observation that some knowledge-based ￿rms choose to locate on
their own. The model is based on the idea that a key distinction between locating
within a cluster rather than in isolation has to do with the competitiveness of the
market for skilled labor. Speci￿cally, since we assume that it is costly for workers to
change locations, an isolated ￿rm can become a monopsonist in the market for the
specialized labor while, within a cluster, workers with industry speci￿c skills can sell
their labor in a competitive labor market. As Manes and Andrews (1994, p. 120)
describe it, the structure of labor markets played a central role in Microsoft￿s location
decision:
￿Paul Allen increasingly argued for a move back to familiar Seattle turf.
Hiring might be simpler in Silicon Valley, but keeping employees would
clearly be harder, a major consideration in a business where the primary
assets walk out the door every night (...) The tremendous demand for
their services had made Bay Area engineers notoriously ￿ckle; at the ￿rst
sign of dissatisfaction, they would ￿nd a position across the street or check
out a ￿job fair￿ brimming with oﬀers.￿
4In addition to the above cited papers in the economics literature, there is also a discussion of
these issues in the management literature. In particular, see Porter (1990). See also Saxenian (1994)
for a forceful discussion of these issues in the case of Silicon Valley.
5Ellison and Glaeser (1997) document that while a slight degree of concentration is widespread,
the more extreme concentration of industries such as automobile and computer exists only in a
smaller subset of industries.
2As the preceding quote illustrates, a competitive labor market can be a two-
edged sword. It can help ￿rms hire labor when they are expanding, but it can also
make it diﬃcult to retain labor. Moreover, as we illustrate in our model, labor is
more eﬃciently utilized within clusters since they can be redeployed to the most pro-
ductive ￿rms. Speci￿cally, within clusters, ￿rms that realize favorable ￿rm-speci￿c
productivity shocks bene￿t from hiring workers that leave ￿rms that suﬀer unfavor-
able ￿rm-speci￿cs h o c k s . 6 This aspect of our model extends the analysis in Krugman
(1991) that considers the advantage of labor market pooling.7
The case for clustering becomes less straightforward when we consider how workers
acquire their specialized skills. Following Rotemberg and Saloner (2000), we show that
there is an added advantage associated with clustering if developing human capital
requires that the worker expends eﬀort. However, if the development of these skills
requires an investment (e.g., training) by the ￿rm, then there is an oﬀsetting cost
associated with clustering.8 In other words, within a cluster, employees appropriate
the value of the skills (and technology) acquired on the job because they can sell
their skills at a competitive price to their employer￿s competitors. Hence, they have
an incentive to put in the eﬀort required to acquire such skills. However, anticipating
this, ￿rms within a cluster have less incentive to invest in their employees￿ human
capital, and thus provide less training than their more isolated counterparts.
Our model captures the interaction between these forces in a parsimonious way
6There is a second line of research that examines the advantages of thick labor markets that arise
from better matching workers with ￿rms. Papers that address the role of the market in improving
the quality of matching include Helsley and Strange (1990, 1991) and Combes and Duranton (2001).
Mortesen and Pissarides (1999) and Pissarides (2000) review the search literature which addresses
the role of market in improving the chances of matching.
7Dumais, Ellison and Glaeser (1997) examine this issue empirically. Speci￿cally, they provide
evidence that plants locate near other industries when they share the same type of labor, and
conclude that ￿labor market pooling is a dominant force in explaining the agglomeration of industry.￿
8Matouschek and Robert-Nicoud (2003) provide a related analysis of the eﬀect of human capital
investments on ￿rms￿ location decisions. See also Grossman and Hart (1986) for a similar trade-oﬀ
in their analysis of vertical integration.
3that explicitly illustrates that the creation and allocation of human capital are two
sides of the same coin: the way that human capital is allocated determines how it
is created. Moreover, the model identi￿es several characteristics that predict which
knowledge-based industries are likely to exhibit clustering. For example, when the
potential for industry-wide growth is not excessive and when ￿rm-level uncertainty is
high, then industries are likely to exhibit clustering. There is also likely to be more
clustering in industries where the workers must exert eﬀort to acquire their skills but
less clustering in growing industries where ￿rms must provide signi￿cant training for
their workers.
The model also provides implications about how diﬀerences between ￿rms within
an industry aﬀect their location choices. Speci￿cally, ￿rms with better growth prospects
are likely to be better positioned to bene￿t from their workers￿ contribution to their
own training and from hiring workers that are trained by their competitors. This
result provides an alternative interpretation to the empirical ￿ndings by Henderson
(1986) and Ciccone and Hall (1996) that productivity increases with the density of
the economic activity and by Holmes and Stevens (2002) that plant sizes are higher
within industry clusters.9 The conventional interpretation of these ￿ndings is that
because of various externalities, productivity is higher in clusters. In contrast, our
results raise the possibility that clusters tend to attract the most eﬃcient ￿rms, rather
than make existing ￿rms more eﬃcient.
We consider three extensions of the main analysis. In the ￿rst extension, we intro-
duce uncertainty about aggregate productivity (i.e., systematic shocks) and analyze
the relative advantages of clusters versus isolation. We ￿nd that a greater degree
of aggregate uncertainty reduces ￿rms￿ incentives to cluster. This is because higher
9There are a number of empirical studies that examine issues that relate to productivity and
agglomeration. For an excellent review, see Rosenthal and Strange (2003).
4aggregate uncertainty in clusters limits ￿rms￿ abilities to reallocate human capital
among themselves and also because, as we show, ￿rms in clusters are not as well
positioned to incorporate information about changes in productivity.
The second extension, which allows ￿rms to design their production processes in
ways that make them more or less compatible with other ￿rms, explores the possibility
that technological choices diﬀer in clusters versus isolation. Speci￿cally, we consider
the incentives of ￿rms to deviate from industry norms in clusters. The analysis
identi￿e st w oo p p o s i n ge ﬀects. By deviating from industry norms, ￿rms increase ￿rm
speci￿c risk, which in turn increases the redeployment bene￿ts of clustering. However,
if the labor employed by ￿rms with very diﬀerent technologies are less compatible,
a countervailing eﬀect emerges. The relative importance of these eﬀects determines
whether clusters prevail in industries in which experimentation and the introduction
of new technologies is central.
In the third and ￿nal extension we consider how behavioral biases aﬀect ￿rms￿
location decisions. Speci￿cally, we show that overcon￿dent entrepreneurs are more
likely to be attracted to clusters because they overvalue the bene￿ts associated with
the ability to hire workers that are trained by their competitors. Within our setting,
overcon￿dence can have social bene￿ts as well as costs. In isolation, overcon￿dence is
costly because it leads to too much training. However, within a cluster, since rational
entrepreneurs train too few workers, it is possible that social eﬃciency and ￿rms￿
pro￿ts can be improved when entrepreneurs are overcon￿dent.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model
and section 3 analyzes it. Section 4 considers the issue of location for heterogenous
￿rms and section 5 presents the analysis of location when workers can also invest.
Section 6 considers location when ￿rms also can choose their technologies and section
7 analyzes how overcon￿dence may aﬀect ￿rms￿ location choices. Section 8 presents
5some conclusions of the analysis. Proofs and other technical derivations are relegated
to the appendix.
2 The model
We consider a risk neutral economy populated by a continuum of ex-ante identical
entrepreneurs (i.e., ￿rms), and an unlimited supply of unskilled workers with reser-
vation wage wR. Firms have access to perfect capital markets and are endowed with
an investment project described below.
As described in Figure 1, there are three relevant dates in the economy, t =0 ,1,
and 2. At t =0 ,￿rms permanently locate. Firms choose whether to locate in a
regional economy that includes other ￿rms that employ and train similar workers (i.e.,
within a cluster), or alternatively, to locate away from the cluster (i.e., in isolation).
At t = 1, the production process starts with an initial stage during which ￿rm i
hires a certain number of unskilled workers H1i a n dt h e nt r a i n sh1i of those hired.10
The actual training is ex post observable but is not veri￿able and hence, the workers
cannot sign a contract with the ￿rm guaranteeing that they will be trained.
At t =2 ,t h egrowth stage, the ￿rm receives a productivity shock. After observing
the shock, ￿rms can contract or expand their operations by either laying oﬀ some of its
existing workers or, within clusters, by hiring new workers who have obtained training
with one of the ￿rm￿s competitors. The main diﬀerence between locating within a
cluster rather than in isolation is the access that ￿rms have to trained workers in the
growth stage. While in a cluster skilled workers are hired in a competitive market, in
isolation, ￿rms have exclusive access to the workers they train at t = 1, and behave
as monopsonists in the labor market. For simplicity, we assume that ￿rms cannot
10For most of the analysis, we assume that training is costly to the ￿rm but requires no eﬀort
from the worker. In section 5, we relax this assumption and examine the case in which workers￿
eﬀort aﬀect the eﬀectiveness of the ￿rm￿s training.
6train new workers at t = 2. The number of trained workers employed by ￿rm i at this
date is denoted as h2i.
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Figure 1: Sequence of Events










Q1(h1i)a n dQ2(h2i) correspond to the production functions during the initial stage
and the growth stage respectively. In each stage, each ￿rm determines the scale of
its operations: h1i during the initial stage, (i.e., the amount of workers trained at
t =1 )a n dh2i during the growth stage (i.e., the amount of trained workers employed
at t =2 ) . W er e f e rt oα>0a s￿rm productivity in the initial stage and to τ>0
as the importance of the ￿rm￿s training costs. In addition, we refer to ai as the ￿rm
productivity in the growth stage and to β>0 as the intensity of the ￿rm￿s adjustment
costs, which make the ￿rm production at t = 2 depend on the initial scale h1i.11
Parameters α, τ and β are deterministic, identical for all ￿rms, and known at t =0
before production starts. In contrast, ai is the realization of a random variable ￿ ai,a
￿rm-idiosyncratic productivity shock that occurs at t = 2 prior to production. The
shock ￿ ai is distributed according to the c.d.f. F(￿ ai)w i t hd e n s i t yf(￿ ai), and bounded
support [aL,a H]. We assume that aL > 0a n d( aH − aL)(τ
β +1)<α ,w h i c hs i m p l i ￿es
the analysis by avoiding non-negativity constraints, and we denote E(￿ ai) ≡ ﬂ a and
E(￿ ai − ﬂ a)2 ≡ σ2. Shocks are independent across ￿rms, speci￿cally, we assume that if
11The presence of symmetric adjustment costs and the technological linkage between the periods
simpli￿es the analysis but are not necessary for the trade-oﬀ between human capital development
and allocation that emerges from the model.
7a continuum of ￿rms populates a cluster then the empirical distribution of realized
shocks, F(ai), is identical to the ex-ante c.d.f., F(￿ ai), i.e., no aggregate uncertainty
exists.12
Notice that we are implicity assuming that the marginal productivity of untrained
unskilled workers is the same inside and outside the ￿rm. That is, unless worker
training is provided, the ￿rm has no special advantage in employing unskilled workers.
This assumption implies that ￿rms bene￿t from employing unskilled workers only
when they can compensate them at a salary below their reservation wage.13
We ￿nish the presentation of the model by specifying three important assumptions
of our model. First, we assume short term labor contracts that cannot be contingent
on training. Hence, our analysis of the contracting issues draws on the literature
on incomplete contracts, i.e., Grossman and Hart (1986), and on the eﬀects of the
inalienability of human capital, i.e., Hart and Moore (1994).14 Second, we assume
that trained workers must stay in their respective locations (i.e., regions) after they
are trained. This assumption captures the idea that individuals initially locate in the
region oﬀering the best employment opportunities, but after establishing roots in the
community ￿nd it costly to relocate. Finally, since we are primarily interested in the
interaction between location and the development and utilization of human capital,
we abstract from the eﬀects that location may have on product market competition.
Speci￿c a l l y ,w ea s s u m eac o n s t a n tp r i c ef o ra￿rm￿s output (that we normalize to one)
12In section 6, we relax this assumption and examine location choices in the presence of aggregate
uncertainty on productivity shocks.
13To save on notation, we have omitted the eﬀe c tt h a tu n t r a i n e dw o r k e r sc a nh a v eo na￿rm￿s
production. Because, as stated in the main text, we assume that the productivity of unskilled
workers outside (i.e., wR) and inside the ￿rm is the same, our results are unchanged if we specify
Qj(hji,u)=Qj(hji)+( θ − wR) • u = Qj(hji)( f o rj = 1,2) where u is the amount of untrained
workers employed and θ is their marginal productivity inside the ￿rm (which is equal to wR).
14In section 5, we revisit this issue and analyze the location problem when both the ￿rm and
workers can make non-contractible relation speci￿c investments. There, we discuss why long-term
contracts themselves can create misincentives in ￿rm-worker relationships.
8and that ￿rms￿ products can be transported costlessly within a competitive market.
3 Analysis of the model
We ￿rst consider the production and training decisions in isolation and then within
an industrial cluster. In each case, we proceed backwards; we start with the scale
decision at the growth stage, h2i, and then consider the scale decision at the initial
stage, h1i.
3.1 Isolation
In isolation, the analysis of the growth stage is straightforward. At t =2 ,t h e￿rm acts
as a monopsonist in the market for skilled workers, and thus pays them the reservation
wage for their services, wR which we normalize to zero.15 Since the supply of skilled
workers is limited by the amount of workers that the ￿rm itself trains at t = 1 (i.e.,








Solving (1) the demand for skilled labor is h∗
2i = h1i (i.e., the ￿rm retains all the
w o r k e r si tt r a i n sa tt =1 ) .
At t =1 ,t h e￿rm decides how many workers to hire and to train. On-the-job
training is valuable to workers but is costly to ￿rms and, more importantly, is non-
contractible among parties. This means that ￿rms will provide training according to
their internal trade-oﬀs without fully incorporating the positive eﬀect of training on
workers, a fact that, as we show, will play a crucial role in clusters. Formally, let H1i
be the number of workers hired, and then, among those hired, let h1i be the number
15This is without loss of generality as long as aL ≥ wR = 0, that is the productivity of a skilled
worker inside the ￿rm is always higher than outside the ￿rm.







+ E(￿ aih1i), (2)
subject to:
h1i ≤ H1i. (3)
Since unskilled workers are equally productive inside and outside the ￿rm, H∗
1i
remains indeterminate in equilibrium (other than H∗
i1 ≥ h∗
1i). Therefore, we solve to
obtain h∗

















which, as showed before, also equals h∗
2i. Substituting in (2) yields the ￿rm￿s value in


















3.2.1 The growth decision








16The explicit distinction between hired, H1i, and trained workers, h1i, is consistent with but
not essential for the analysis of the ￿rm￿s decision in isolation. However, we choose to keep the
distinction in the isolation analysis to maintain parallelism with the cluster analysis below, where
such a distinction plays a crucial role. Also notice that although workers hired at t = 1 must receive
the reservation wage the expressions are simpli￿ed due to the normalization wR =0 .
10where w is the wage paid to the skilled workers at t = 2. From the f.o.c., we obtain








A c c o r d i n gt o( 8 ) ,￿rm i hires (￿res) additional workers if its realized productivity, ai,
is greater (smaller) than the wage at t =2 ,w. The importance of the adjustment
costs (measured by β) determines the sensitivity of the ￿rm￿s demand for skilled
workers to ai.
To determine the wage that clears the market in the cluster at t = 2, i.e., w,w e
























Market clearing, i.e., DH
2 = SH
2 , yields the equilibrium wage which is equal to the
average productivity of the ￿rms in the cluster, i.e., w =ﬂ a.
3.2.2 The initial scale decision
At t = 1, because on-the-job training is non-contractible among parties, ￿rms will
provide such training according to their internal trade-oﬀs without fully incorporating
the positive eﬀect of training on workers. Consequently, workers will be wary of taking
lower wages against promises of future skills that will not necessarily be provided.
We model this time-inconsistency by considering that, ￿rst, a ￿rm hires a certain
number of workers H1i at t = 1 and then, among those hired, the ￿rm allocates
17Notice that, by virtue of the independence of technology shocks,
R aH
aL aif(ai)dai =ﬂ a.
11h1i of them to positions that provide on-the-job training. This optimal training
decision is anticipated (i.e., rationally expected) by workers who condition their initial
salary demands at t =0 ,w0i, on the total number of workers hired by the ￿rm.
Speci￿cally, workers consider the probability of being trained as the ratio of the
anticipated number of workers trained, he
1i, to the number hired, H1i, and reduce


























Constraint (12) captures the fact that the ￿rm may choose not to train some of the
hired workers while constraint (12) considers the salary reduction from the reservation
wage, which is normalized to zero, that workers will accept when hired by the ￿rm
as compensation for their expected human capital acquisition (i.e., a participation
constraint for workers). Notice that with the initial salary reduction, −w0i,w o r k e r s




H1i, and, if trained, her salary increases at t =2b yw.18 Substituting
constraint (12) into (11) reveals that H∗
1i is indeterminate in equilibrium (other than
H∗
1i ≥ h∗
1i). This is due to our assumption that unskilled workers are equally produc-
tive inside and outside the ￿rm. Consequently, without loss of generality, we assume
that the ￿rm hires only the workers that it can credibly claim to train, which implies
that H∗
1i = h∗
1i. Given this, the following problem can be solved to obtain ￿rm i￿s
18This contrasts with the case of isolation in which workers do not reduce their wages, i.e., w0i =
wR = 0, because workers realize they will not capture any of the value of their developed human





















Substituting w =ﬂ a and h∗
2i = h1i+
ai−ﬂ a
β , and considering that the anticipated level
of training he















Expression (15) shows that, in clusters, a ￿rm￿s initial scale decision is ￿myopic,￿
i.e., it is not aﬀected by its expected productivity ﬂ a. While, all else equal, a higher
expected productivity increases the ￿rms￿ incentive to invest in human capital, it also
increases the wage at t = 2, and hence, reduces the ￿rms￿ incentive to create human
capital. In an economy of identical ￿rms, these two eﬀects oﬀset each other leading
to the ￿rms￿ myopia on their initial scale decisions.














which can be decomposed into three terms: (i) the value created from production
in the ￿rst period (i.e., Q(h∗
i1)=α2
2τ ), (ii) the value of the human capital created by
the ￿rm (as measured by the wages obtained by the workers trained by the ￿rm, i.e.,
he
1iw = α
τ ﬂ a) and (iii) the value of the option to adapt the scale of production in the






19To be sure, even though in a (rational expectations) equilibrium the actual level of training
equals the workers￿ conjecture, he
1i = h∗
1i, the conjectured level of training cannot be aﬀected by the
￿rm.
133.3 The choice of location
When deciding their locations, ￿rms face a trade-oﬀ between the advantages of isola-
tion on the creation of human capital and the advantages of clusters on the utilization
of human capital. This trade-oﬀ, which is apparent by comparing (6) and (16), is
described in the following proposition:












Proposition 1 summarizes the main implications of the analysis so far. In indus-
tries where trained workers are more productive, i.e., larger ﬂ a, the relative value of
isolation increases. In contrast, when there is more uncertainty about which ￿rms
will be most productive, i.e., when σ2 is larger, the relative value of clustering is
higher. In addition, the relative value of clusters vis-‘ a-vis isolation is also related to
the importance of the ￿rm￿s adjustment costs and the cost of creating human capital.
Speci￿cally, large adjustment costs (i.e., high β)r e d u c et h ev a l u eo f￿exibility in the
cluster, and hence, of clustering, while large costs of creating human capital (i.e., high
τ), make the acquisition of human capital from clusters relatively more attractive,
and hence, promotes clusters.
More intuition about the location trade-oﬀ can be gained by examining how a
social planner would allocate resources in this economy. The social planner must
consider two issues: the optimal creation of human capital at t = 1, and its optimal
utilization at t = 2. The competitive market in the cluster allocates skilled workers
(once trained) optimally. Hence, the social planner would simply replicate the worker
allocation that occurs in the cluster: h∗
2i = h1i+ai−ﬂ a
β . Therefore, the planner￿s problem
is reduced to ￿nding the optimal ￿rm scale at t = 1 in the presence of a competitive
14labor market, but without the time inconsistency problem in the creation of human
capital by ￿rms (e.g., by assuming that ￿rms internalize the future salary gains that
workers obtain from ￿rm training). Formally, the problem would be identical to the
clustering program but where the term he

















From the f.o.c., we get hFB
1i = α+ﬂ a

















Notice that in the social planner￿s solution, ￿rms would utilize human capital as they
do in the cluster, but would create human capital as they do in isolation. Formally,
this is re￿ected in an additional positive component (with respect to the value in
isolation) due to the optimal reallocation of human capital, i.e., V FB
i = V I
i + σ2
2β,a n d
a positive additional component (with respect to the value in clusters) due to the
optimal investment in human capital, i.e., V FB
i = V C
i + ﬂ a2
2τ.
3.4 An alternative speci￿cation
We conclude this section by brie￿y discussing an alternative speci￿cation that pro-
duces a trade-oﬀ that is similar to the one obtained here. Speci￿cally, rather than
assuming that training is not contractible, we could have assumed that the workers
lack the resources to pay-up front for their training, i.e., there is a minimum wage on
the ￿rst date that exceeds the equilibrium wage that includes the discount workers
are willing to take to receive their training. Of course, both assumptions require, ad-
ditionally, the inalienability of workers￿ human capital once acquired (i.e., that ￿rms
become residual claimants of their workers￿ human capital).
15Intuitively, with either friction, ￿rms within clusters do not fully internalize the
improvements in their workers￿ human capital, and thus underinvest in their worker￿s
training. In the case that we consider, the fact that training is not contractible
creates a time inconsistency problem (namely, once workers agree to reduce their
initial salaries, ￿rms feel tempted not to honor their training commitment). Similarly,
when there is a minimum wage at t =0 ,￿r m si nc l u s t e r sm a yn o tb ea b l et ob e n e ￿t
from training their workers, and may thus undertrain their workers when they cannot
make binding commitments. In contrast, an isolated ￿rm can capture the bene￿to f
training their workers in the ￿rst period because they can underpay them relative
to their productivity in the last period. As was the case in the previous model, this
implies that ￿rms are more likely to isolate when the gains associated with human
capital creation are the highest.
We chose to present the model with the non-contractibility assumption in order
to simplify the analysis and to facilitate welfare comparisons. However, we feel the
limited liability (i.e., minimum wage) alternative can be a compelling assumption in
some circumstances and constitutes, in any case, an additional foundation for our
analysis that reinforces our results.
4 The location choice of heterogeneous ￿rms
Up to this point, we have considered an economy of (ex-ante) identical ￿rms. In this
section, we introduce ￿rm heterogeneity to the analysis. We proceed as follows: First,
we present a partial equilibrium analysis, where we take as given the presence of a
cluster with salary w a n de x a m i n et h el o c a t i o nc h o i c eo f￿rm i,w h i c hi sa s s u m e d
to be too small to aﬀect w. Once we characterize the individual ￿rm￿s incentives to
cluster, we consider the general equilibrium analysis where all ￿rms simultaneously
16choose where to locate, and examine the endogenous formation of clusters.
4.1 The location decision of an individual ￿rm
Consider ￿rm i with productivity ￿ ai which is distributed with c.d.f. Fi(￿ ai) and density
fi(￿ ai), and where ￿ ai ∈ [aLi,a Hi]w i t haLi > 0. Let ﬂ ai ≡ E(￿ ai)a n dσ2 ≡ E(￿ ai − ﬂ ai).
Firm￿s i value in isolation immediately follows from (6) in the previous section, i.e.,
V I
i = α2




2τ. However, to derive its value in the cluster, we must modify the
analysis to take into account that, in general, ﬂ ai 6= w. Following similar steps as before




α +( ﬂ ai − w)
τ
(20)


















Notice that if a ￿rm￿s expected productivity is equal to the cluster wage, i.e., ﬂ ai = w,
the expressions obtained in the case with homogenous ￿rms hold. That is, (20)
converges to (15), i.e., h∗
1i = α
τ and (21) converges to (16), i.e., V C
i = α2
2τ + αﬂ ai
τ + σ2
2β.
To examine ￿rm i￿s incentives to join a cluster with wage w, we subtract (6) from













As was the case with homogenous ￿rms, the decision is determined by the trade-oﬀ
between the bene￿ts of the cluster (i.e., redeployment of human capital,
E(￿ ai−w)2
2β )a n d
its costs (i.e., underinvestment in human capital, w2
τ ). Further intuition, however, can













17from which we can see that the bene￿ts of redeploying human capital stem from: (i)
ex-ante diﬀerences between expected productivity and the cluster average productiv-
ity, i.e.,
(ai−w)2
2β , and (ii) ex-post diﬀerences among ￿rms￿ realized productivities, i.e.,
σ2
2β. In other words, the bene￿ts of joining a cluster come from date t =2d i ﬀerences
in productivity that may or may not be anticipated.
Notice that the ￿rst eﬀect (i.e.,
(ai−w)2
2β ) induces clustering even in the absence of
uncertainty (i.e., σ2 = 0), because ￿rms with expected productivity that is greater
(smaller) than the wage expect to hire (￿re) workers at t = 2 (i.e., E (h∗
2i) − h1i =
ﬂ ai−w
β ). Because of the decreasing returns to scale in the creation of human capital,
there is an eﬃciency gain associated with having the ￿rms with a low need for human
capital at t = 2 train more workers than they need and indirectly transfer those work-
ers to higher productivity ￿rms, which create less human capital than they want to
employ. Although a ￿rm does not directly compensate its competitors for the trained
workers that join their ￿rms, indirect compensation accrues to the net providers of
human capital who, when located in clusters, can oﬀer a lower wage rate at t =1 . 20
An examination of (23) allows us to consider the factors that in￿uence a ￿rm￿s
decision to join the cluster:
Proposition 2 Clusters are more attractive for ￿rms with: (i) higher variance pro-
ductivity, σ2, (ii) lower adjustment costs, β, (iii) higher costs of creating human
capital, τ, and (iv) expected productivity that diﬀers more from the cluster wage, i.e.,
higher |ai − w|.
Proposition 2 shows that clusters are relatively more valuable when either an-
20Consulting ￿rms generally need substantially more associates (i.e., the more junior consultants)
than partners, and as a result, a number of associates eventually go to work for their clients. This
observation can be viewed from the perspective of our model if we view the consulting ￿rms as
expecting date t = 2 productivity that induce them to shed employees. As such, our model provides
a rationale for why consulting ￿r m sa n dt h e i rc l i e n t sm a yb e n e ￿t from locating near each other.
18ticipated (i.e., |ai − w|) or unanticipated (i.e., σ2)d i ﬀerences in productivity give a
reason to redeploy human capital and also when such a redeployment is not expensive
(i.e., low β).21 Furthermore, if ￿rms are not eﬃcient at producing human capital (i.e.,
low τ) the underinvestment problem in clusters is ameliorated (the diﬀerence between
the production of human capital in clusters and in isolation is w
τ ).





dw < 0) unless ﬂ ai < (1 −
β
τ)w. While, in general, a higher wage exacer-
bates the underinvestment problem and reduces the incentive to cluster, ￿rms whose
productivities are suﬃciently below the wage (ﬂ ai < (1−
β
τ)w)c a nb e n e ￿tf r o mh i g h e r
cluster wages. For these ￿rms (which are on average ￿big sellers￿ of human capital
in the cluster), the higher wage produces an increase in the expected revenue from
the human capital sold that more than oﬀsets the additional revenue lost due to an
exacerbated underinvestment problem.22
4.2 Endogenous clusters with heterogeneous ￿rms
In the previous section, we examined the incentives of ￿r m st oj o i na ne x i s t i n gc l u s t e r
with an exogenous wage, w. This section examines the endogenous formation of clus-
ters, i.e., the simultaneous decision of ￿rms that can isolate themselves or can locate
within an endogenously formed cluster.
For simplicity, we assume that there is a continuum of ￿rms with random expected
productivities ￿ ai = ai +￿ εi where ￿ εi are zero-mean i.i.d. random variables, and g(ﬂ ai)
21Notice that for ￿rms with expected productivity above the wage, ﬂ ai >w , higher productivity
increases the ￿rms￿ incentive to cluster. However, the opposite holds for ￿r m sw i t he x p e c t e dp r o -
ductivity below the cluster wage. Taken together, this implies that the incentives to cluster are the











dw + E [h∗
2i − h∗
1i]=−w
τ − ﬂ ai−w
β . An increase in the wage
reduces the creation of human capital at t = 1 (￿rst term) and increases the bene￿ts of ￿selling￿
human capital at t = 2 (second term). Therefore, if a ￿rm sells enough human capital (i.e., if w−ﬂ ai
β
is large enough), a ￿rm can bene￿t from a higher wage.
19is the frequency of ﬂ ai in the population. We assume that ai is positive and with
bounded support, i.e., ai ∈ [aL,aH]. We consider equilibria characterized by the
formation of a unique cluster C w h i c hm a yc o n t a i nap o s i t i v em a s so f￿rms, with
the rest of the ￿rms choosing isolated locations.23 Under these conditions, because
shocks are independent across ￿rms, the average productivity in the cluster (i.e., the
cluster wage) is deterministic and given by w =ﬂ aC =
R
i∈C ﬂ aig(ﬂ ai).
The following proposition, which is proved in the appendix, describes the various
equilibria that are possible in this setting:
Proposition 3 The following types of equilibria can emerge in the above described
setting: (i) an equilibrium where all ￿rms are isolated, (ii) an equilibrium where all
￿rms locate within a single cluster, and (iii) an equilibrium where ￿rms with both the
highest and lowest expected productivities join a cluster and where the middle ￿rms
locate in isolation. The equilibrium that emerges depends on the population of ￿rm
characteristics, however, for certain ￿rm characteristics, multiple equilibria arise.
Proposition 3 states that there may be multiple equilibria where only those ￿rms
with the largest and the smallest future expected productivities cluster. In the ap-
pendix, we provide a simple example in which two alternative clusters of diﬀerent
sizes and wages can emerge in equilibrium. Speci￿cally, if ￿rms expect a low wage at
t = 2 in the cluster, most ￿rms join the cluster and the cluster wage is indeed low.
Alternatively, if ￿rms expect a high t = 2 cluster wage, fewer ￿rms join the cluster,
and the cluster wage ends up being high. In the example, the low-wage, larger cluster
dominates (in a Pareto sense) the high-wage, smaller cluster, suggesting that policy
23For simplicity, we do not consider the possibility that more than one cluster can simultaneously
arise. This would simply complicate the analysis without providing additional insights. In fact, in
the case of multiple coexisting clusters, it is easy to show that all of them would have the same
average productivity (i.e., cluster wage) and would exhibit the same properties as the ones described
below.
20initiatives that promote larger clusters can be welfare-improving.
The possibility of (self-ful￿lling) multiple equilibria suggests a potential role for
public intervention.24 Speci￿cally, in the example, a contingent policy of wage sub-
sidies (e.g., an oﬀer to subsidize wages in the event that equilibrium wages exceed
the level that occurs in the good equilibrium) will attract more of the low expected
productivity ￿rms to the cluster, which in turn generates lower wages, so that the
subsidy will not in fact be required.25
5 Location analysis when workers also invest
Up to now, we have focused on the case where training is not aﬀected by the workers￿
eﬀort. This section extends the analysis to consider the location choice when both
workers and ￿rms can aﬀect the creation of human capital. Formally, we assume that
during the initial stage, each worker can exert costly eﬀort l, which enhances the
human capital provided by the ￿rm. Speci￿cally, we assume that eﬀort multiplies the
worker￿s acquired human capital by a factor (1 + l) and costs the worker C(l)=kl2
2 .
Hence, each worker solves maxl(w(1 + l) − kl2





.( 2 4 )
In addition, as in the basic case, we assume that the investment in human capital at
t =1( b yb o t ht h e￿rm and its workers, i.e., (1 + l)hl
1i)a ﬀects the ￿rm￿s adjustment
24Public intervention may be required to the extent that the private sector fails to solve the
coordination problem. See Rauch (1993) for an analysis of the role of history in the location of
industrial clusters and how developers of industrial parks can partly overcome historical inertia.
25A number of individuals have argued for policy initiatives that promote clustering in knowledge
based industries. For example, Lawrence Summers, the president of Harvard University expressed
the following opinion on the importance of promoting clustering at the Massachusetts Life Sciences
S u m m i th e l di nB o s t o no n0 9 / 12/2003: ￿I am convinced that, as strong as (...) the life science cluster
is today without combined eﬀorts, it can be far stronger ￿ve years from now and still stronger a
decade from now. And with all of our cooperation, Harvard is certainly prepared to do its part. I
believe we can do a great deal for science, for humanity, and for the economy of this area.￿
21costs at t = 2. Formally, this implies that ￿rm i￿s production function at t =2i s
Q2 = aih2i − β
(hl




w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h es u p e r - i n d e xl to distinguish this case from the case in which
workers￿ eﬀort cannot aﬀect their human capital.
5.1 Homogeneous ￿rms
We consider in this sectionthe case where ￿rms have identical distributions of their
future productivities, i.e., Fi(￿ ai)=F(￿ ai) for all i. Because in isolation ￿rm￿s monop-
sony power allows them to capture all the bene￿ts from the workers￿ human capital,
workers have no incentives to contribute to their training (i.e., l∗ = 0). Therefore, the
value of the isolated ￿rm, V I
i,l, is still given by V I
i from equation (6) i.e., the value in















In clusters, however, since workers capture the bene￿ts of the increase in their
human capital, they do have an incentive to exert eﬀort. In this case, ￿rms solve at





















Because the supply of human capital per ￿rm is hl
2i =( 1+l)hl
1i, market clearing
yields w =ﬂ a. Then, proceeding as in previous sections, we can solve ￿rm i￿s problem
22at t = 1, (i.e., maxhl
1i αhl
1i − τ (hl
1i)
2
2 )t oo b t a i nhl∗
1i = α
τ .26 Substituting hl∗
1i, hl∗
2i and l∗




































From (30), we can make two observations. First, in addition to the factors pre-
viously identi￿ed (i.e., σ, β, τ,a n dﬂ a), two other factors aﬀecting ￿rm location arise
(i.e., α and k). In particular, clustering is more valuable when workers contribute
substantially to the creation of human capital (i.e., low k and hence high l∗)a n da l s o
when ￿rms invest heavily in training at t = 1 (i.e., high α and hence high hl∗
1i). This
last result holds because of the complementarity between ￿rm training and worker
eﬀort, i.e., because workers￿ eﬀort multiplies the human capital provided by ￿rms.27
Second, we can identify a suﬃcient condition for clustering to dominate isolation
(i.e., α>k ). This condition illustrates an additional rationale for ￿rms to cluster
even when there is (i) no uncertainty about ￿rm productivity (i.e., σ2 =0 )a n d( i i )n o
ex-ante diﬀerences in productivity (i.e., Fi(￿ ai)=F(￿ ai)). Intuitively, clusters induce
workers to contribute to the creation of human capital by mitigating workers￿ hold-up
concerns. This happens because, in contrast to isolation, where ￿rms capture the gain
associated with the additional human capital created by workers, in clusters workers
with more human capital receive higher wages at t =2 . 28




by (15). This is in contrast with the result obtained in the next subsection, when diﬀerences in
productivity across ￿rms are introduced.
27A recent paper by Rosenthal and Strange (2002) shows that, after controlling for worker spe-
ci￿c characteristics, professional workers work longer hours in urban clusters which suggests that,
consistent with the analysis here, cities encourage hard work.
28We are not the ￿rst to identify the role of the markets in mitigating hold-up problems. This
235.2 Heterogeneous ￿rms
This section extends the previous analysis to the case of heterogeneous ￿rms (i.e., to
a setting like the one in section 4.2). The main purpose is to examine whether the
ability of workers to contribute to their human capital can have diﬀerent eﬀects on
the incentives of heterogeneous ￿rms to cluster.
In isolation, the analysis remains unchanged because workers do not have incen-
tives to invest in human capital. In clusters, however, the analysis changes. Substi-
tuting hl∗
2i (given by (28)) into the ￿rm￿s objective function at t = 1 and simplifying














Notice that now, in contrast to the case with identical ￿rms, workers￿ incentives
aﬀects the ￿rm￿s incentive to create human capital at t = 1 (i.e., note the factor
(1 + l∗)). The reason is that workers￿ investment in human capital, because of the





α +( ﬂ ai − w)(1 + l∗)
τ
, (32)
and the ￿rm value in the cluster, V C

































1i and V C
i are, respectively, the demand for labor and value of the clustered
￿rm when workers cannot invest in human capital, i.e., expressions (20) and (21).
role has been recently considered in the Urban Economics literature, i.e., Rotemberg and Saloner
(2000), and Matouschek and Robert-Nicoud (2003) and in the International Trade literature, i.e.,
McLaren (2000), and Grossman and Helpman (2002).




2 depends on workers and ￿rm investments
in human capital (i.e., l and hl
1i respectively). Hence, as shown in (28), hl∗
2i =( 1 + l)hl
1i + ai−w
β .
24From expression (33), we can see the diﬀerence in value arising from the workers￿
investment in human capital. We denote this diﬀerence as ∆V C
i,l ≡ (V C
i,l−V C
i )a n dr e f e r
to it as the ￿eﬀort-eﬀects.￿ Speci￿cally, these eﬀects are: (i) a direct eﬀect due to the
additional creation of human capital by workers (i.e., the term in the ￿rst bracket)30
and (ii) an indirect eﬀect stemming from the adjustment of the ￿rm￿s demand for labor
















+( 2 ﬂ ai + w)
‚
, (34)
reveals that ∆V C
i,l is positive for ﬂ ai >w , negative for ﬂ ai < w
2, and ambiguous for
the remaining range. It can also be easily shown that ∆V C
i,l increases with the ￿rm￿s
expected productivity ﬂ ai. Hence, the following proposition can be stated:
Proposition 4 Workers￿ investment in human capital (i.e., the eﬀort-eﬀects) in-
crease the incentives of high productivity ￿rms (ﬂ ai >w ) to cluster and of low produc-
tivity ￿rms (ﬂ ai < w




dﬂ ai > 0).
While it is easy to understand why the investment in human capital can promote
clustering (in isolation workers do not invest in human capital), it is less straightfor-
ward to understand why it can lead ￿rms to isolate. The potential incentive to isolate
occurs because workers do not in general exert the eﬀort most preferred by ￿rms,
and in some cases, exert too much eﬀort. To be sure, while workers make their eﬀort
30This term corresponds to the additional human capital produced by workers, l • hl∗
1i, multiplied
by the expected pro￿ts of per unit of human capital, (i.e., ﬂ ai −k l∗
2 =ﬂ ai − w
2 ). The expected pro￿ts
per unit consist of what the ￿rm expects to obtain at t = 2, (i.e., ﬂ ai − w) plus the reduction in its
labor costs at t = 1 (i.e., w − k l
2).
31Notice that, due to the eﬀort-eﬀects, both hl∗
1i and (due to the adjustment costs) E(hl∗
2i)c h a n g e
by
(ﬂ ai−w)l∗








τ ﬂ ai at t =2 .
25decision at t = 1 based on the wage they expect to receive (i.e., maxl(wl−kl2
2 )), ￿rms
expect to receive from that eﬀort only the ￿rm￿s expected productivity, ﬂ ai (net of the
cost of eﬀort) at t = 2 (i.e., ﬂ ail−kl2
2 ).32 Speci￿cally, if ﬂ ai <w(ﬂ ai >w )w o r k e r s ￿e ﬀort
is too large (too small) from the point of view of the ￿rm. Furthermore, when the
￿rm￿s expected productivity is small enough (i.e., ﬂ ai < w
2), workers￿ eﬀort actually
reduces the value of the ￿rm (i.e., the ￿rm would be better oﬀ if workers exert no
eﬀort rather than l∗).
The prior discussion focuses on the bene￿ts of the eﬀort-eﬀects on clustering.33 To
examine how workers￿ eﬀort aﬀect the comparative statics on ￿rm location discussed
in section 4, we need to consider the other factors that in￿uence clustering and how
they interact with the eﬀort-eﬀects. For brevity, we focus next on the eﬀect of a ￿rm￿s
expected productivity on location.
As proposition 4 states, workers￿ eﬀort induces high productivity ￿rms (ﬂ ai >w )
to cluster, and low productivity ￿rms (ﬂ ai <w )t oi s o l a t e .I nc o n t r a s t ,a sr e s u l t( i v )i n
proposition 2 shows, without workers￿ eﬀort, the incentive to join the cluster increases




dﬂ ai = ﬂ ai−w
β ) so that, clusters exhibit a U-shape. The joint consideration of these
two results implies that workers￿ eﬀort reinforces the tendency of high productivity
￿rms (ﬂ ai >w ) to cluster and weakens the tendency of low productivity ￿rms (ﬂ ai <w )
to do so.34 In fact, as the following proposition states, under certain conditions,
￿eﬀort-eﬀects￿ dominate and reverse the tendency of low productivity ￿rms to join
the cluster:
32Notice that, due to the adjustment costs, worker eﬀort increases the ￿rm￿s demand for skilled
labor at t = 2, which has an expected productivity of ﬂ ai.
33Eﬀort-eﬀects do not aﬀect isolated ￿rms, since V I
i,l = V I
i . Hence, ∆V C
i,l i sa l s oam e a s u r eo fh o w
these eﬀort-eﬀects aﬀect ￿rms clustering vis-a-vis isolation, i.e., (V C
i,l − V I
i,l)−(V C
i − V I
i )= ∆V C
i,l.




















dﬂ ai may still be negative.





dﬂ ai > 0.
The intuition for the proposition is as follows: As discussed above, workers fail to
consider the full eﬀects of their eﬀort on ￿rm value, so ￿rms can even experience a
reduction in value due to their workers￿ eﬀort. This externality is more pronounced
when α is larger because, in this case, ￿rms choose a higher hl∗
1i, and workers choose
ah i g h e re ﬀort, i.e., l∗hl∗
1i.
The discussion above, although made in the context of a given wage (i.e., partial
equilibrium) has implications on the issue of the endogenous formation of clusters.
In contrast to the case without eﬀort-eﬀects, where ￿rms with low as well as high
productivity have the highest incentives to cluster, eﬀort-eﬀects produce an additional
impetus for ￿rms with the highest productivity to join the cluster. This suggests that
the empirical evidence on the bene￿ts of clusters should be cautiously interpreted.
For instance, an alternative interpretation to the ￿ndings by Henderson (1986) and
Ciccone and Hall (1996), that productivity increases with the density of the economic
activity and by Holmes and Stevens (2002), that plant sizes are higher within industry
clusters, is that clusters attract the most eﬃcient ￿rms, rather than make existing
￿rms more eﬃcient.
We ￿nish this section with a brief mention of one important assumption that we
maintain throughout the analysis: the fact that we do not allow long-term contracts
between workers and ￿rms. While realistic legal reasons can justify this assumption,
this section provides an additional justi￿cation for the exclusion of long-term con-
tracts. Consistent with Grossman and Hart (1986), the impossibility to contract in
the actual provision of human capital (both by ￿rms and by workers) can severely
reduce the ability of long-term contracts (e.g., a guaranteed wage set at t =1i n
27exchange for the worker￿s labor services at t = 2) to induce the eﬃcient human cap-
ital investment. In this setting, unless workers receive some bene￿ts at the margin
from their investments in human capital, they fail to provide eﬀort and, hence, a
suboptimal creation of human capital would prevail.35
6 Aggregate uncertainty, ￿rm-speci￿cr i s ka n dt e c h -
nology standards
So far, we have considered ￿rm speci￿c shocks and hence, our economy has been char-
acterized by no aggregate uncertainty. In this section, we ￿rst introduce uncertainty
about aggregate productivity (i.e., systematic shocks), and then we allow ￿rms to
design their production processes in ways that make them more or less sensitive to
these systematic shocks. To simplify the exposition, we perform the analysis in the
basic setting of sections 3 and 4 which abstracts from workers￿ eﬀort in the creation
of human capital.
6.1 Location and aggregate uncertainty
We introduce aggregate uncertainty (i.e., correlated productivity shocks) by modeling
a ￿rm￿s random productivity at t =2a s :
￿ ai =ﬂ a + γ
1/2￿ v +( 1− γ)
1/2￿ bi (35)
where ﬂ a>0i sd e t e r m i n i s t i ca n d￿ v, a systematic shock, and ￿ bi,a￿rm-idiosyncratic
shock, are two independent random variables.36 We assume that 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, E(￿ bi)=
35The analysis also suggests that there may be diﬀerences in how workers are compensated in
clusters vis-a-vis isolated ￿rms. In isolation, inducing worker eﬀort is the more important incentive
problem, suggesting that it may be optimal to consider incentive compensation contracts. In clusters,
worker retention is the more important concern for ￿rms, so we may expect to see longer-term
compensation contracts to address this issue. Although we have abstracted from these issues in our
model, these compensation issues would be interesting to explore in future work.
36Our previous analysis can be seen as a particular case of this model in which γ =0 .
28E(￿ v)=0 ,Va r(￿ v) ≡ σ2
v,a n dVa r(￿ bi) ≡ σ2
b (and hence, V (￿ ai) ≡ σ2 = γσ2
v+(1−γ)σ2
b).
In addition, we further decompose the systematic shock ￿ v into
￿ v = θ
1/2￿ v1 +( 1− θ)
1/2￿ v2 (36)
where 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1,E (￿ v1)=E(￿ v2)=0a n dVa r(￿ v1) ≡ σ2
v1 and Va r(￿ v2) ≡ σ2
v2.W e
assume that the realization of ￿ v1 (i.e., v1)i sk n o w nt o￿rms after they locate at t =0
but before they make their training decisions at t =1( i . e . ,h1i). However, v2,t h e
realization of ￿ v2,i sk n o w nb y￿rms only after they have chosen h1i. The parameter θ
measures how much of the aggregate shock is known by ￿rms before they make their
training choices.
As before, a ￿rm￿s location choice boils down to a comparison of its value in
isolation and in the cluster. In isolation, the human capital created at t =1 ,h1i,
depends on the ￿rm￿s expected productivity at t = 2, which, for a given realization
of ￿ v1 is: E(￿ ai|v1)=ﬂ a+θγv1.H e n c e ,￿rm value conditional on v1 (i.e., V I
i |v1)c a nb e








(α +ﬂ a + θ1/2γ1/2v1)2
2τ
. (37)












Equation (38) shows that although, an isolated ￿rm ￿nds the distinction between




2τ in (38)) when it can incorporate more information (i.e., the shock
v1) into their investment decision, h1i.
In clusters, however, the distinction between aggregate and ￿rm-speci￿cr i s ki s
relevant because aggregate shocks, since they aﬀect all ￿rms, in￿uence the wage at
29t =2 . T o￿nd the value of a clustered ￿rm, we ￿rst obtain ￿rm and wage values
conditional on given realizations of v1 and v2,a n dt h e n ,w es u c c e s s i v e l yi n t e g r a t e
over v2 and v1 to ￿nd the ex-ante (unconditional) ￿rm and wage values.
For a given v1 and v2, market clearing implies that w|v1,v 2 =ﬂ a + γ(θ1/2v1 +( 1−















Taking expectations over v2 and bi,w e￿nd that the expected wage is E(w|v1)=




























Examining (41), note that, in contrast to the case of isolation, ￿r m si nc l u s t e r sd o
not take advantage of the early release of information about the aggregate shock,
v1, and, as a result, ￿rm value is not aﬀected by ￿ v1. Notice that in the cluster, the
creation of human capital at t = 1 is independent of the aggregate productivity shock
(i.e., h1i = α
τ ). While a positive shock in a ￿rm￿s expected productivity increases, all
else equal, its creation of human capital, a positive aggregate shock also increases the
wage at t = 2 (i.e., w =ﬂ a + v1)which reduces the ￿rm￿s incentives to create human
capital.37 In other words, as (20) shows, the creation of human capital by a clustered
37Formally, h1i = α
τ + E(￿ ai|v1) − E(w|v1)=α
τ .T h ef a c tt h a tE(￿ ai|v1)=E(w|v1) is an artifact
of the production function that we consider. However, the presence of two oﬀsetting eﬀe c t si sq u i t e
general: an increase in expected productivity tends to increase wages and, hence, to discourage
￿rms￿ creation of human capital.
30￿rm is not determined by its expected productivity, but by the diﬀerence between




Also, from (41), notice that the value of clustered ￿rms depends on the ￿rm-
speci￿c variance, σ2
b, but not the variance of the systematic shock, σ2
v.T h i si sb e c a u s e
clusters enhance ￿rm value by reallocating human capital from ￿rms with low produc-
tivity shocks to ￿rms with high productivity shocks. In the limiting case where the
shocks are perfectly correlated, i.e., γ = 1, there would be no reallocation of human
capital in the cluster and, hence, no bene￿t to clustering.

















which leads us to state the following proposition:
Proposition 6 For a given level of total risk, the value of clustering vis-a-vis isola-
tion increases with the relative importance of ￿rm-speci￿c risk (low γ) and the level
of the aggregate risk that is not anticipated (low θ).
Proposition 6 suggests that, empirically, clusters are more valuable in industries
in which ￿rms￿ productivity experience highly idiosyncratic shocks (i.e., high σ2
b), and
in which aggregate industry productivity is diﬃcult to predict (i.e., low θ).
6.2 Firm-speci￿c risk and technological standards
In this section, we endogenize the technology choice and consider choices involving
the sensitivities of technologies to ￿rm-speci￿c and systematic risks. Speci￿cally, we
assume that ￿rms can increase their exposure to ￿rm-speci￿c risk (and decrease sys-
tematic risk) by selecting a production process that deviates somewhat from what
we will refer to as ￿the standard production process.￿ As we have shown, in clusters,
31there is a bene￿t associated with increasing ￿rm-speci￿c risk that can lead clustered
￿rms to deviate from the industry standard. Oﬀsetting this bene￿t is the possibil-
ity that the adjustment costs associated with transferring workers from one ￿rm to
another are higher if a ￿rm chooses a less standard production process.
To examine the choice of technological standards, we endogenize the parameter
that captures the intensity of the adjustment costs at t = 2 (i.e., βi). In particular,
we assume that a higher βi is associated with a less standard production process and
therefore, with an increase in the ￿rm￿s exposure to idiosyncratic risk, i.e., in (35) we
set (1 − γ)=g(βi)w h e r e0<g (βi) < 1,g 0 > 0a n dg00 < 0, and hence:
￿ ai =ﬂ a +( 1− g(βi))
1/2￿ v + g(βi)
1/2￿ bi,( 4 3 )
where, as before, ￿ v is a systematic shock and ￿ bi is a ￿rm speci￿c shock. Shocks ￿ v











Firms choose their technology (i.e., βi) after locating, but before starting the
initial stage of production. For simplicity, we assume that both the industry and the
￿rm-speci￿c shocks are unanticipated, i.e., θ =0 .




which is not aﬀected by adjustment costs and the choice of risk.38 However, in clusters,














38This is because (i) in isolation, ￿rms do not adjust their scale at t = 2 and (ii) the shocks
(￿rm-speci￿c and aggregate) are unanticipated.
39It is easy to check that, in this case, w =ﬂ a, h∗
1i = α

















As (46) shows, a more idiosyncratic technology, (i.e., a higher βi) produces two
opposing eﬀects: (i) it makes the redeployability of human capital costlier and hence,
reduces the value of locating in the cluster and (ii) it makes the possibility of rede-
ploying human capital more valuable (i.e., higher idiosyncratic variance g(βi)σ2
b)a n d








As a ￿nal observation notice that previous results suggest that, empirically, the
choice of technology by a ￿rm is correlated with its location. This is because while
idiosyncratic risk and low adjustment costs increase the real option value of being in
the cluster, they do not have any impact on isolated ￿rms. Therefore, if there is, say,
a trade-oﬀ between the mean and variance of diﬀerent technologies, an isolated ￿rm
will choose the technology that maximizes expected productivity, while clustered ￿rms
will face a trade-oﬀ between expected productivity and speci￿city (i.e., idiosyncratic
risk and adjustment costs).40 Speci￿cally, ￿rms within a cluster are willing to take
on more risk, subject to being not too incompatible with their competitors.
7O v e r c o n ￿dence and the location choice
Up to this point we have assumed that entrepreneurs make rational location choices.
However, there is substantial evidence in the psychology literature that suggests that
40Isolated ￿rms may actually choose technologies that are more or less risky than the technologies
chosen by clustered ￿rms. Firms within clusters bene￿t from (idiosyncratic) risk but also, from
being compatible with other ￿rms within the cluster.
33individuals are overcon￿dent about their abilities (e.g., Einhorn 1980), and there is
an extensive literature that explores the implications of overcon￿dence on economic
behavior.
To explore the eﬀect of overcon￿dence on the location choice, we extend the basic
model from sections 2 and 3 to allow for the possibility that entrepreneurs have biased
perceptions of their ￿rms￿ expected productivity. Speci￿cally, at t = 0, entrepreneur i
wrongly believes that ￿rm i￿s expected productivity is above the average productivity
of the economy, ﬂ ao
i =ﬂ a + ∆ with ∆ > 0, but correctly believes that the rest of the
￿rms have the same expected productivity ﬂ a. Workers understand that entrepreneurs
are overcon￿dent and act accordingly.41
In isolation, the analysis with overcon￿dence corresponds to the analysis in the









τ . Hence, from (6), the
￿perceived￿ ￿rm value at t =0 ,V I














2τ + αﬂ a
τ + ﬂ a2
2 . We can also compute the ￿rm value under the ￿true￿










Notice that while overcon￿dence increases the perceived value (which is the value on
which the ￿rm bases its location decision) V I
i,o >VI
i , it induces ￿rms to overinvest in
human capital and hence, reduces the true ￿rm value (which we use to analyze the
welfare implications of the location choice), V I
i,T <VI
i .
In clusters, overcon￿dence increases the creation of human capital by ￿rms, i.e.
41In this setting, it is irrelevant what a given ￿rm i thinks about other ￿rms￿ overcon￿dence. As











that, at t =2 ,o v e r c o n ￿dence increases the aggregate supply and demand of skilled
labor at t = 2 by the same amount and, hence, leaves unaﬀected the cluster wage,





















2τ + αﬂ a
τ + σ2
2β, and computing the expectation of ￿rm value under the












Expression (50) shows that, as in isolation, overcon￿dence increases perceived value,
V C
i,o >V C
i . Furthermore, in contrast to isolation, V C
i,T >V C
i for moderate over-
con￿dence, i.e., ∆ < 2ﬂ a,a n dV C
i,T <V C
i for excessive overcon￿dence, i.e., ∆ > 2ﬂ a.
Intuitively, overcon￿dence allows the ￿rm to commit to training more workers and
hence, ameliorates the problem of underinvestment of human capital. However, ex-
cessive overcon￿dence can lead to the creation of too much human capital and reduce
￿rm value.
Given the above analysis, it is straightforward to show that overcon￿dence in-













This is consistent with results from previous sections which indicate that ￿rms with
(expected) productivity above the cluster average have an incentive to join the cluster.







β follows immediately from (8) and h
∗
1i = α+∆
τ follows from (20).
43Although the wage remains unchanged, the linkages between periods that appear as a conse-
quence of adjustments costs have important eﬀects on the welfare results discussed below.
35Proposition 7 Assume that without overcon￿dence ￿rms cluster, (i.e., σ2
β > ﬂ a2
τ ),
then overcon￿dence increases welfare (i.e., true ￿rm value) if and only if ∆ < 2ﬂ a.
Assume alternatively that without overcon￿dence ￿rms isolate (i.e., σ2
β < ﬂ a2
τ )a n d




2 and ∆1 ≡ 2ﬂ a − (ﬂ a2
τ − σ2
β ) then overcon￿dence:
(i) leaves ￿rms in isolation and reduces welfare if ∆ < ∆0.
(ii) leads ￿rms to cluster if ∆0 < ∆,andincreaseswelfare if and only if ∆0 < ∆ < ∆1.
We ￿nish this section discussing the robustness of its main result, namely, the fact
that overcon￿dence leads to more clustering.44 While a comprehensive analysis of the
eﬀects of overcon￿dence on ￿rm location is beyond the scope of this paper, we can
e x a m i n es o m eo ft h ee ﬀects previously discussed. For instance, when one considers
worker eﬀort, overcon￿dence will enter the location choice through an additional
channel. In particular, as we showed in section 5, when workers contribute to the
creation of their human capital, ￿rms with relatively high productivity bene￿tf r o m
being in a cluster, while ￿rms with relatively low productivity bene￿tf r o mb e i n gi n
isolation. In the terminology of section 5, eﬀort-eﬀects are positive for ￿rms which
have or believe they have future productivity that is above the average. This reinforces
the conclusion that clusters are more likely to emerge when ￿rms are overcon￿dent
about their future productivities.
We also could have considered an analysis in which workers, as well as entre-
preneurs are subject to overcon￿dence. In this case, a relatively straightforward
extension of our model would suggest an additional force that encourages clustering.
Speci￿cally, since high ability workers capture the gains associated with their superior
human capital within a cluster, but not when they are isolated, workers who believe
44A parallel analysis with ￿undercon￿dence￿ (i.e., ∆ < 0) may have some similar eﬀects on location
but will not lead to value creation in clusters. The reason is that while overcon￿dence serves as a
commitment to train workers, alleviating the time inconsistency problem, undercon￿dence will have
the opposite eﬀect.
36that they have superior ability will prefer locating within the cluster, leading to lower
expected wages that attract ￿rms.45
8C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
In the early literature on location choice, transportation costs play a key role. Cities
arise because of proximity to transportation hubs (e.g., ports) as well as to relatively
immobile factors of production. While these theories are still quite important, they
do not really apply to what we refer to as knowledge-based ￿rms, which require skilled
labor, very little transportation costs, and have no exogenous natural locations. There
is substantial evidence that the share of aggregate output coming from knowledge-
based ￿rms continues to increase, so it is natural to ask whether this trend will have
an in￿uence on the development of our urban areas.46
In contrast to most of the discussion in the literature, the model developed in this
paper suggests that ￿rms in knowledge-based industries will not necessarily choose to
cluster. Speci￿cally, we show that the incentive for ￿rms to locate in industry clusters
is determined by how skills are developed, the nature of uncertainty, the expected
growth rate of the industry and the ability of ￿rms to expand and contract. When
workers contribute to their own training, and when there is a substantial amount
of ￿rm speci￿c uncertainty, there are likely to be substantial gains to clustering.
45However, not every conceivable extension of the model would lead toward a clustering eﬀect
of overcon￿dence. For instance, if a ￿rm is overcon￿dent about its ability to train workers (i.e.,
low τo) or about the industry prospects (i.e., high ﬂ a), then overcon￿dence exacerbates the perceived
underinvestment problem in clusters (i.e., hI
i − hC
i = ﬂ ao
τo), and may foster isolation. We thank Ed
Glaeser for suggesting these quali￿cations to our conclusions.
46Consistent with the increased importance of what we have characterized as knowledge-based
￿rms, a recent paper by Glaeser and Kohlhase (2003) provide evidence that indicates that trans-
portation costs for goods declined considerably in the 20th century, while transportation costs for
people increased. They ￿nd that the U.S. population has moved away from transportation hubs to
regions with better consumption opportunities (e.g., better weather). However, they do not examine
whether cities have become more economically focused, which one would expect if knowledge-based
￿rms tend to cluster to take advantage of knowledge spillovers.
37However, in growing industries, in which ￿rms invest substantial amounts in their
workers￿ human capital, ￿rms may be better oﬀ locating apart.
A number of policy issues are raised by the analysis. First, when there are eco-
nomic advantages associated with clustering, there can be coordination issues that
policymakers need to address. For example, our model suggests that there can be
ineﬃcient equilibria where too few ￿rms cluster, which in turn, suggests that there
may be potential gains from policies that indirectly promote clusters, perhaps by of-
fering training subsidies. On the other hand, if entrepreneurs are overcon￿dent there
can be too much clustering, which suggests that policies that promote clustering can
potentially be misguided.
Policymakers also like to think about issues relating to competing clusters. Indeed,
representatives of the high tech community in Austin, Texas think about competing
with the Silicon Valley cluster and the Hong Kong ￿nancial community often express
concerns about their competitive advantage relative to Singapore. Since our model is
restricted to equilibria with single clusters, we do not address this issue directly, how-
ever, the analysis has implications that can be extended to evaluate the competitive
advantage of diﬀerent clusters.47 Speci￿cally, the more successful clusters are likely
to be those that attract ￿rms that are diﬀerent in dimensions that make them sensi-
tive to diﬀerent economic shocks, yet similar enough to share resources. In addition,
clusters will be more successful in regions where workers have the ability to acquire
human capital without a substantial investment by ￿rms. Indeed, Saxenian (1994),
in a study of the computer industries in Silicon Valley and Route 128, concluded that
Silicon Valley was much more successful that Boston in the 1980s because cross-￿rm
networking opportunities in Silicon Valley facilitated the reallocation of workers be-
47See Porter (1990) for an extensive discussion on this topic which includes both the implications
on productive decisions by ￿rms as well as on public policy.
38tween ￿rms (i.e., reduced adjustment costs) and helped the more industrious workers
develop their human capital.
Finally, it should be noted that factors that determine the extent to which ￿rms
isolate and cluster in physical space can also be applied to the extent to which ￿rms
locate in other dimensions as well. For example, competitors may be better able to
pool labor and other inputs if the ￿rms have similar products, similar production
processes, and similar organizational structures. We believe that the analysis in
this paper can be applied to address issues relating to industrial clustering on these
dimensions, as well as to a theory of corporate inertia, that would arise if corporations





It follows immediately from the text.
Proposition 2

























(i) Because aL ≤ w ≤ aH, as u ﬃcient condition for isolation is that, for the maximal
diﬀerences with the wage, ￿rms of extreme pro￿tability (i.e., aL and aH) ￿nd isolation





2τ < 0 and if ﬂ ai = aH






(ii) If all ￿rms cluster, then w =ﬂ a. Substituting w for ﬂ a in (23) yields
(ﬂ ai−ﬂ a)2+σ2
2β − ﬂ a2
2τ.







dﬂ ai = ﬂ ai−w
β , it follows that if ￿rm k (￿rm j) with expected productivity
ﬂ ak <w(ﬂ aj >w ) belongs to the cluster, then ￿rm k0 (￿rm j0)w i t hﬂ ak0 < ﬂ ak (ﬂ aj0 > ﬂ aj)
will also belong to the cluster. Therefore, a partial cluster will be composed of all the ￿rms
whose expected productivities belong to the set [aL,ac
L]∪[ac
H,aH], where ﬂ ac
L and ﬂ ac
H are the
cluster limits. To characterize these cluster limits we need to solve for the ﬂ ai￿s that leave
￿rms indiﬀerent between the cluster and isolation. Setting V C
i − V I




τw2−σ2)1/2 and ﬂ ac
H(w)=w+(
β
τw2−σ2)1/2. Hence, an equilibrium where
only ￿rms with productivities ai / ∈ (ﬂ ac
L,ﬂ ac
H) cluster is characterized by the simultaneous




From (34), notice that if (ﬂ ai − w
2) < 0 then ∆V C
i,l < 0, while if (ﬂ ai − w) > 0 then
40∆V C
i,l > 0.F r o m ( 3 3 ) ,
d∆V C
i,l


































From the proof of proposition 4,
d∆V C
i,l




τ and taking the derivative in




dﬂ ai = ﬂ ai−w












Furthermore, if α (and hence, hl∗




dﬂ ai > 0.
Proposition 6
It follows immediately from the text.
Proposition 7
Because overcon￿dence induces clustering, ￿rms that would cluster in the absence of over-
con￿dence will also cluster in the presence of overcon￿dence. Therefore, overcon￿dence
changes true ￿rm value according to (51), which is positive if and only if ﬂ a>∆
2 .
However, ￿rms that isolate in the absence of overcon￿dence (i.e., V C
i − V I
i < 0)m a y
cluster due to overcon￿dence (i.e., V C
i,o − V I
i,o > 0).S p e c i ￿cally, from (52) and (17):
V C
i,o − V I
i,o = σ2
2β − ﬂ a2
2τ + ∆2
2β which is positive if and only if: ∆ > (
βﬂ a2
2τ − σ2)1/2 ≡ ∆0.





Otherwise, if ∆ > ∆0 ￿rms cluster, and in that case: V C
i,T − V I
i =
‡




2β − ﬂ a2
2τ >
0 ⇔ ∆ < 2ﬂ a − (ﬂ a2
τ − σ2
β ) ≡ ∆1.
9.2 Other technical derivations
Equation (16)
Substituting in (13) w =ﬂ a, h∗
2i = h1i + ￿ ai−ﬂ a
β ,a n dhe
1i = h∗
1i = α




2τ + E[(￿ ai − ﬂ a)(α




τ , which simpli￿ed yields (16).
Equation (19)
Substituting in (18) w =ﬂ a, h∗
2i = h1i + ￿ ai−ﬂ a
β ,a n dhe
1i = h∗
1i = α+ﬂ a





2τ +E[(￿ ai −ﬂ a)(α+ﬂ a





τ , which simpli￿ed yields (19).
41Equation (21)
Substituting in (13) w =ﬂ a, h∗
2i = h1i + ￿ ai−w









2τ + E[(￿ ai − w)(
α+(ﬂ ai−w)





















and substituting w =ﬂ a, hl∗
2i =( 1+l)hl
1i + ai−w








2τ + E[(￿ ai − ﬂ a)(α


























1i[(1 + l∗)ﬂ ai − k•l∗2








1i − τ (h∗
1i)
2
2 and simplifying we get (33).
Equation (34)


















τ andl∗ = w
















k (ﬂ ai−w)ﬂ ai
τ , and simplifying we get (34).
Equation (39)
From (13), we get V C
i |υ1,υ 2,b i = αh1i −
τh2
1i




2 |υ1,υ 2,b i]+
he
1iE [w|υ1]. Then, recognizing that w|υ1,υ 2 =ﬂ a + γ1/2
h















1i = α+ﬂ a+∆
τ in (4) and simplify to get (49).
Equation (50)
Start from V C

























42Eo[(￿ ai − ﬂ a)(α+∆





τ , which simpli￿ed is (50).
Equation (51)
Plug w =ﬂ a, h∗
2i = h1i + ￿ ai−ﬂ a
β ,a n dhe
1i = h∗
1i = α+∆
τ in (13) and simplify to get (51).
Example of multiple (Pareto ranked) equilibria.
Individual ￿rms technologies: β =1 ;τ = 11
8 , and σ2 = 189
11 and the empirical distribution
of ﬂ ai is piecewise uniform (i.e., uniform in subintervals [2,3], [3,4], [4,6], [6,9] and [9,10]) such
that G(2)=0; G(3)=0.2; G(4)=0.6; G(6)=0.72; G(9)=0.8; G(10)=1,w h e r eG ( x)≡
R x
2 g(ﬂ ai).
Under these conditions, and using the expressions derived in the proof of proposition 3
above, the following clusters can emerge:
(1) A ￿high-wage￿ cluster with w =6and limits {ac
L,ac
H} = {3,9}.T h a ti s :w = E[ﬂ ai |
ﬂ ai / ∈ [3,9]] = 6; ac
L(6) = 3 and ac
H(6) = 9.
(2) A ￿low-wage￿ cluster with w =5and limits {ac
L,ac
H} = {4,6}.T h a ti s :w = E[ﬂ ai |
ﬂ ai / ∈ [4,6]] = 5; ac
L(5) = 4 and ac
H(5) = 6.
Notice that the low-wage cluster Pareto-dominates the high-cluster one, because, even the
lowest expected productivity ￿rm (i.e., aL =2 )b e n e ￿ts from having a w =5rather than











β < 0 ⇐⇒ 3
11w<ai,w h i c h
holds for aL =2 ,w =6 .
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